On what Ontology Is and not-Is by Verelst, Karin
On what Ontology Is and not-Is
Karin Verelst
FUND-CLEA
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels
kverelst@vub.ac.be
Indeed, language is an organ of perception,
not simply a means of communication.
J. Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness
Introduction
In this contribution we place the relation between logic and classical meta-
physics in a new light. We shall turn our attention to what Plato calls “di-
alectics” [Sophist, 253(c)], the method (in the original sense of “the way to
follow towards”) by which true knowledge is acquired. This method remains
fully embedded in his ontology, causing him, according to a widely held view, to
lapse into elementary logical errors. A more subtle objection imputes on him the
so-called “Socratic fallacy”.1 We, on the contrary, hold that there are no such er-
rors in Plato’s method precisely because of its onto-logical nature: when studying
Plato’s “logic” one is simply studying his metaphysics from another angle; the
structural properties of the latter can shed light on the logical structure of the
former. Sayre puts it succinctly: The connection between Forms and definitions
is that participation in the Form constitutes what the formula defines.2 This al-
lows Plato to straightforwardly explain the nature of dialectics: For it is from
the mutual intertwinement of the Forms that reasoning comes forth [Sophist,
259(e)]. This is testified explicitly by Aristotle in [Met. A, 987b(31-32)]. It is
not our intention to enter here into the delicate problem of the way things in
the world participate into Forms in another ontological realm, but we accept
— with Sayre — that at least the later Plato was convinced to have found a
satisfactorily solution to it. We can therefore both agree and disagree with M.
1This attirbution of such fallacies started with P. Geach’s influential article “Plato’s Eu-
thyphro: An Analysis and Commentary”, The Monist, 50, 1966, pp. 369-382.
2K.M. Sayre, Plato’s Late Ontology, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,
1983, p. 8.
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Dixsaut in her penetrating study of the transformations Plato’s notion of di-
alectics underwent throughout the dialogues: Que la dialectique ne soit pas une
“methode”, mais la science la plus haute ne faisant qu’un avec le chemin qu’elle
se fraie est un trait essentiel de la philosophie Platonicienne, inse´parable a` la
fois de la repre´sentation qu’il se fait de la pense´e et de l’hypothe`se des formes.3
We comply to that, except for the fact that this is exactly why Plato’s dialectics
is a genuine method. When studying the classics, it is our conception of method
that needs a change.4
Our approach shall be to revisit Plato’s idea that, in order to find out the spe-
cific Form of which a given thing is an instance, one has to proceed by dichotomic
division. We construe this division as the logical backbone of Plato’s late ontol-
ogy, its “pattern of reality” according to Cherniss.5 Following a suggestion by G.
Priest6 we shall then show that the logic shoring up Plato’s metaphysical system
— the doctrine of Ideas and the participation theory — is paraconsistent. As
such it is the “missing link” between the paradoxical way of thinking of the pre-
Socratics and classical onto-logic as established by Aristotle. Plato’s teachings
constitute the bridge that crosses the abyss between two utterly different forms
of conscious relation to reality as it is “given”: pre-Socratic world-articulation
and classical (metaphysical) world-description. In the first part of this paper I
will sketch how precisely the ontologically paradoxical, deictic first person stand-
point in reality of the archaic period differs from the essentially logical, third
person view-point on reality as presented by classical metaphysics. In the sec-
ond part I shall analyse how Plato tackles this problematic pre-Socratic legacy
mainly in the form presented by Parmenides and his followers, and why he lays
out the groundwork for almost all future attempts to deal with it: a metaphysical
system in which the pre-Socratic paradoxes are resolved by a radical world
division in which being is separated from non-being, though in such a way that
sufficient common ground remains present to fulfill the need for justification
of the multiplicity and mutability we experience in ‘phaenomenal’ reality. A
metaphysical system is not just a grand story that explains the basic features of
reality as a whole, nor even a characterisation of “being qua being”, to quote the
Peripatetic formula. It will be shown that Plato achieves this remarkable feat
basically by transforming Zeno’s paradoxical One-and-Many into a paraconsis-
tent Large-and-Small. In the last part of this paper, a more in depth formal
analysis is presented, and the link to Aristotle’s system — who “completes” the
work both from the metaphysical and the logical point of view — is shortly
discussed.
3M. Dixsaut, Me´tamorphoses de la dialectique dans les dialogues de Platon, Vrin, Paris,
2001, p. 9.
4The idiosyncratic nature of Modern ideas on method is the subject of a paper entitled In-
finity and the Sublime, which I presented at the Centre for Mathematical Sciences, Cambridge,
October 2006 [forthcoming].
5H. Cherniss, The Riddle of the academy, Russell & Russell, New York, 1962, p. 42.
6G. Priest and R. Routley, “First Historical Introduction. A Preliminary History of Para-
consistent and Dialethic Approaches”, in: Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on the Inconsistent,
Philosophia Verlag, Mu¨nchen, 1989, p. 19.
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Pre-Socratic Paradoxicality
We shall at first briefly reconsider the often misunderstood pre-Socratic legacy,
summed up concisely in the Parmenidean dictum tä âän êsti (the Being-Now
is [DK 28B 6]). In the present everything is.7 The reference to spatio-temporal
presence is essential, although absent from the common translation (the) Being
is. Restoring it turns Parmenides’s claim from an incomprehensible declaration
with bizarre consequences into the infallibly true statement that it was intended
to be.8 Indeed, you cannot indicate anything here and now that does not exist! I
shall call the unmediated relation to reality constituted by this truly indicative
capacity of a speaking “world-centre” which points at and thus points out while
addressing another one with the same capacity deictic, in reference to and in
honor of the French linguist Emile Benveniste, who introduced the notion of
deixis in his investigations of the role of the “first person” in natural, spoken
language.9 Interestingly enough the situation in which a deicitc centre literally
stands is ontologically paradoxical, for it instantiates a coincidentia opposito-
rum. At every moment one is and is not at the same place at the same moment,
because the now can never be fixed or stabilised, so that identity does not ex-
ist outside this very same moment. This implies that the principle of identity
does not hold. It moreover precedes spatio-temporal differentiation: I am Here-
Now. It is not experienced as a problem because it is experienced, not merely
thought. This is exactly what Heraclitus pointed out with his famous riverfrag-
ment, which states that one cannot step into the same river twice [DK 22 B 49a].10
Revealingly enough, the later philosophical tradition saw him as the opponent
of Parmenides. I, however, take it that this deictical stance straightforwardly
explains both Heraclitus and Parmenides, and thus that Conche is right when
he says: La pense´e de Parme´nide se comprend d’une manie`re comple`te si l’on
y voit une double radicalisation de la pense´e d’He´raclite.11 In this respect the
pre-Socratics remain much closer to Homer than to Aristotle, even when much
closer to the latter in time: Greeks like Aristotle and we to-day have apparently
attained to greater ‘detachment’, power of thinking in cold blood without bodily
movement, as we have to a sharper discrimination and definition of the aspects
and phases of the mind’s activity. It is with the consciousness, the knowing self,
7The fact that “is” with Parmenides cannot possibly refer to some abstract, eternal cate-
gory — as it does with Plato — has been discussed by N.-L. Cordero, Les deux chemins de
Parme´nide, Paris, 1984.
8K. Riezler, Parmenides. Text, U¨bersetzung, Einfu¨hrung und Interpretation, Vittorio
Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1970, p. 45-50. That the in origin dialectal difference between tì
în and tä âän had acquired philosophical significance becomes explicit in Diogenes of Appolo-
nia, a contemporary to Zeno, where t înta [ta onta; the beings] are stable essences, while
t âänta nÜn [ta eonta nun; the beings-now] are instable phaenomenological things. See L.
Couloubaritsis, La Physique d’Aristote, Ousia, Bruxelles, 1997, p. 308.
9E. Benveniste, “Le langage et l’expe´rience humaine”, in: Proble`mes de linguistique
ge´ne´rale II, Gallimard, Paris, 1966, p. 69. I discussed this with respect to archaic reality-
awarenessin detail in the third chapter of my PhD-thesis: K. Verelst, De Ontologie van den
Paradox, doctoral dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2006.
10One should appreciate the acuity of his disciple Cratylus who, seeing the consequences of
the non-temporality of the now, states that one could not do it even once.
11M. Conche, Parme´nide. Le Poe`me: Fragments, PUF, 1999, p. 26.
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the spectator aware of what happens within and without (. . .) that a man would
tend more particularly to identify himself.12 The shift from first to third person
induces the separation of subject and object, by loosening or even breaking the
ties between a man’s embodied awareness and his mental activity. In this sense
one could say that, in the pre-Socratic era, the mental disposition prerequisite
to the possibility of metaphysical thought was still lacking: the capacity to re-
present the absent as present on a logically structured inner mental scenery,
as described, incidentally, for the first time by Plato in his myth of the Cave,
and internalised by Aristotle with his conception of fantasia as an inner mental
screen [De anima, 3.3].13 Quoting von Fritz’s comment on these developments
in extenso is worthwile:
(...) the concepts of the “obscure” Heraclitus are all perfectly clear and
can be very exactly defined. In contrast, the empiricist Sextus, whose ar-
guments seem so clear and easy to many readers, has no clearly identifiable
concept of either logos [reason] or nous [mind] at all. Nous with Sextus
is either identified with logos or considered a manifestation of it. Logos,
where Sextus speaks in his own name, is most often “logical reasoning” or
the capacity of logical reasoning (...). But where Sextus reports the views of
other philosophers, logos becomes just the alternative to aisthesis [percep-
tion], whatever this alternative may be, and so loses all clearly identifiable
meaning. Yet it is highly illustrative of the change which the con-
cept of nous had undergone between Heraclitus and Sextus that Sextus,
in trying to explain Heraclitus’ concept, begins by connecting it with a
term the preponderant meaning of which is “reasoning” and ends by al-
most identifying it with “sensual perception.” Heraclitus’ own concept
of nous, as we have seen, was clearly distinguished from both but
somewhat more nearly related to the latter than to the former. To the
archaic mind, to think is to see, to have an insight, not to make an
inference from a priori praemises: The fundamental meaning of the
word noeØn in Homer is “to realize or to understand a situation”.14
When one speaks, one does so not about a possible world, but about (everything
in) this world — kìsmoc tìde according to Heraclitus [DK 22B 30] —, behind the
surfaces of which nature likes to hide: (. . .) it is still the primary function of the
nìoc to be in direct touch with ultimate reality15, i.e., with this world as it is im-
12R.B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1994 [1951], p. 18.
13I owe this latter connection to F. De Haas, Leiden University. For a discussion of Aristotle’s
notion of fantasia, see G. Watson, “Fantasia in Aristotle, De Anima 3. 3”, The Classical
Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 32, 1 1982, pp. 100-113. A more recent study is A.D.R. Sheppard,
Phantasia and Inspiration in Neoplatonism. In Studies in Plato and the Platonic tradition,
M. Joyal (ed.), Aldershot, 1997, pp. 201-10.
14K. Von Fritz, “Nous, noein and their derivatives in pre-Socratic philosophy”. Reprinted in:
A. P. D. Mourelatos, The pre-Socratics. A collection of critical essays, Princeton University
Press, Princeton etc., 1992, pp. 42-43; p. 23 (my bold).
15K. Von Fritz, o.c., p. 52.
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mediately and fully present and within deictic reach.16 The lack of temporality
manifest in the deictic “first person” standpoint thus has a spatial counterpart.
It is not spatiality that individuates a being, but a being-present that instanti-
ates a space...17 “Space” nor “time” exist as independent backgrounds against
wich a mentally representable event takes place: Il n’y a pas de cosmogonie [chez
He´raclite] malgre´ l’apparence, parce qu’il n’y a pas de repre´sentation (. . .).18 It is
by indication that the validity of an utterance is shown. But, as already said, this
is a paradoxical situation, because this centered absolute simultaneity excludes
any rigid identity.
The paradoxical ontology underlying these I-Here-Now utterances19 is epito-
mised in the notorious paradoxes of Zeno, a disciple of Parmenides. If my deictic
reading of the pre-Socratics is correct, then the key to a correct understanding
of all — both Plurality and Motion — arguments based on Zeno’s divisional
procedure is that they do not presuppose space, nor time. Division merely re-
quires extension (with a “here” and a “there”) of a physical object present to
the senses and takes place simultaneously. Zeno shows (and this is the appropri-
ate word) that plurality and motion are examples of the fundamental paradox
of Being and non-Being as instantiated in the here-and-now. He nowhere denies
the reality of plurality and change; he simply points out their paradoxical na-
ture. This I call Zeno’s deictic realism.20 One could say that his paradoxes
are not problems but descriptions of real states of affairs. It is plain that Zeno’s
arguments are not a reductio, because the logical prejudice that something which
implies paradoxes cannot “really be there” is still unthinkable, for logic itself
does not yet exist!21 Thus Simplicius’s attestation that [In his book, in which
many arguments are put forward,] he shows in each that stating a plurality
comes down to stating a contradiction: kaj' ékaston deÐknusi, íti tÀ poll eÚnai
lègonti sumbnei t ânantÐa lègein [Simpl., Phys., 139 (5) (DK 29B 2)] turns out
16Conche translates “ce monde-ci”. M. Conche, He´raclite. Fragments, Presses Universitaires
de France, 1986/1998, pp. 279-280.
17How this “body-bound” localisation of the of the spatiotemporal centre of reference
amounts into a modern notion of relativity has been shown by H. Poincare´, “La Relativite´
de L’Espace”, in Science et Me´thode, p. 92. I gave an overview of the issues involved in a
presentation entitled Deixis and Theoria. Insight and Inference from Aristotle to Poincare´,
for the ECCO-seminar at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, May 23, 2007. See also the remark in
the DK apparatus, vol. I, p. 254.
18J. Bollack, H. Wismann, He´raclite ou la se´paration, Ed. de Minuit, Paris, 1972, p. 49.
19I introduced these notions in my PhD-Thesis: K. Verelst, De Ontologie van den Paradox,
doctoral dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2006.
20Zeno’s paradoxical procedure is analysed in detail from this perspective in: K. Verelst,
“Zenos Paradoxes. A Cardinal Problem. I. On Zenonian Plurality”, in: Paradox: Logical,
Cognitive and Communicative Aspects. Proceedings of the First International Symposium of
Cognition, Logic and Communication, Series: The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition,
Logic and Communication, Vol. 1, University of Latvia Press, Riga, 2006.
21Vastos’s reading is interesting as a witness to our distorted understanding of this fact:
Three distinct inferential sequences are joined to form a unified argument, exhibiting, probably
for the first time in a philosophical context, the reductio in its most powerful form, “if P ,
then C and not-C. [Therefore not-P .]” But the latter assertion is nowhere in the material.
G. Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy, volume I: The Presocratics, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1993, pp. 219-240.]
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to be entirely correct. In what are traditionally called the plurality arguments,
this contradiction appears in the stature of the mikr te eÚnai kaÈ mègala — the
large[s]-and-small[s] [DK 29B 1] —, the infinity of segments with and the infin-
ity of segments without magnitude that result from Zeno’s divisional procedure
simultaneously.22 Their simultaneous presence is precisely what keeps an ex-
tended body finite. Although the argument is by no means a dilemma23, one
could use the dilemma-construction to prove this by contraposition.
Only after the invention of metaphysics - i.e., after Plato - it becomes
possible to understand the two key figures of pre-Socratic thought, Heracli-
tus and Parmenides, as standing in contradiction to each other, as defending
opposite “worldviews”. The supposedly contradicting conclusions deriving from
pre-Socratic philosophy were of a major concern to both Plato and Aristotle,
because they challenged the existence of truth and certainty about the world, by
now conceived of as external, and therefore about the actions of human beings
in it. One will appreciate the depth of the abyss that separes this abstracted,
mediated third person relation to the world from the first person immediacy
of the pre-Socratic reality-participation gone before. The uncertainty flowing
forth from the attempt to define everything from the outside had given rise to
a sceptical discipline, Sophism, that simply denied any relation between reality
and what we can say about it. Its subjectivism stems from a radical empiricism,
which holds that things are for me as I perceive them. The Sophists thus seem to
speak in terms of the archaic coincidentia, but no deictic link between percep-
tion and perceived is preserved, so that “I” can say anything about whatever:
first person perceptive immediacy has been replaced by third person subjective
empiricism. Nevertheless reminiscences to the old ontology lurk underneath, as
is clear from Protagoras’s famous quote man is the measure of all things, ex-
isting and non-existing. Plato cites it [Theaetetus 160(d,e))] in an attempt
to point out both its origins and consequences: since reality as we perceive it
is always in a process of permanent change it implies also the non-existence of
stable, individual things in the world. What follows for knowledge out of the
ontology of permanent change is the “everything is equally true”, which reveals
itself as the epistemological face of the coincidence of opposites, accord-
ing to Plato the very foundation of the Heraclitean universal change theory.
Therefore Sophism is nothing else but an instance of the ontology of perma-
nent change, already advanced — according to Plato — by earlier thinkers like
Heraclitus. Now on this soil the principle of contradiction rests, because if you
allow contradiction, you will be allowed to say whatever: ex falso quodlibet
(Theaetetus, 150, 182(e)-183(a)). The dramatic consequences of the shift in per-
spective from the first to the third person could hardly be more clearly exposed:
what was once the seat of deictic certainty had been transformed into the source
of irreparable deception. But how to conceal the quest for certainty with our
experience of permanent change in this world? This will only be possible by
stabilising human world-experience in a world-picture, strong enough to survive
22The te kai construction stresses the fact that both are the case at the same time.
23Of the disjunctive particles ¢? ¢toi [or] needed to construe the argument as a dilemma
there is no trace.
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the paradoxical present into the past and the future.24 Strong foundations must
be laid to grant the possibility to experience entities as objects outside of the
stream of events, and therefore to speak about them in an “objective” way.
Thence the well-known scaffold of Plato’s solution: the division of the world in
two separated, though connected, layers with a different ontological status: a
basic unchangeable, motionless ‘Parmenidean’ or ‘Eleatic’ Being which grants
certainty about both objects and names, and an unstable ‘Heraclitean’ non-
Being, which allows for the change and motion in the world as presented to our
senses. The paradox of the being of non-being is resolved by Plato and Aristotle
by taking non-Being as a modus of Being – of a lesser ontological degree.25 This
feature of a two-layered world (a “world behind the world”), is precisely what
makes their worldviews metaphysical. The widely acclaimed chasm between
Plato’s and Aristotle’s systems can be understood from this point of view as a
mere variation on a common ontological theme required to solve the paradoxes.
One can charcterise the metaphysical variants by the paradoxes they presup-
pose: while Plato in his dialogues discusses mainly Zeno’s paradoxes of plurality,
Aristotle confines himself almost exclusively to the paradoxes of motion. This
amounts in their ‘static’ vs. ‘dynamic’ metaphysics respectively. But we already
saw that, by later testimonia, ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ should come down to the
same [Simplicius [DK 29B 2]. Given that Plato and Aristotle had both access
to Zeno’s book, how is this to be understood?26 Especially since Plato equally
stresses the underlying unity of Zeno’s arguments [Parmenides, 127(e)]: (. . .) Is
the intention of your arguments to vindicate, against all that is [commonly] said,
that plurality does not exist? And you think that each of your arguments is a
proof of just that, so that you believe you have produced as many proofs that
plurality does not exist as are the arguments you have composed?27
My impression is that Aristotle, giving up on Plato’s line of attack, contents
himself with a less ambitious claim which has at least the advantage that it can
be physically grounded.28 I think we touch the heart of the matter here. Indeed,
it is clear even on superficial inspection that underlying Zeno’s paradoxes some
idea must be present common to them all.29 Then whence do these different
24The necessary condition that made possible this construction of stabilising world-pictures
or “worldviews”, was the earlier coming-to-be of the “inner mind-space”, in which the non-
present could be re-presented as present. This crucial notion is introduced and discussed in
J. Jaynes, The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind, Houghton
Mifflin Company, Boston, 1976, , p. 54 sq.).
25Pelletier gives a detailed overview of the different possible positions, with reference to
certain passages in the Sophist discussing what he calls “Parmenids’ problem’; F.J. Pelletier,
Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being, Univ. of chicago Press, Chicago and
London, chapters two & four.
26This is discussed in detail by G. Vlastos in a highly illuminating article, “Plato’s testimony
concerning Zeno of Elea”; reprinted in G. Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy. Vol. I: The
Presocratics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993, pp. 264-300.
27Vlastos’s translation, VLAS, p. 273. My bold.
28If this be true, than it explains why Aristotle redirected his attention from metaphysics to
physics, and not the other way around, as it is generally held in the literature. I thank again
F. De Haas for pointing out to me this consequence of my own analysis.
29This insight has been defended, but not conclusively shown by G.E.L. Owen, “Zeno and
the mathematicians”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 8, 1957. In my paper on Zeno’s
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approaches come from?
Plato’s Conceptual Division
Now let us look at how precisely this kind of ontological paradox informed the
core of Plato’s metaphysical set-up. In the Phaedo, the first text ever to contain
a clear formulation of the principle of contradiction, there is an extremely illu-
minating discussion of the relationship between the joining of two physical parts
and the addition of two mathematical line segments, where Plato again refers to
the “contradictory” viewpoints on the causes of plurality and change proposed
by pre-Socratic philosophy.30 Socrates complains that, since it allows for akin
things to have contradictory causes, while phaenomena clearly distinct become
causally undistinguishable, its results cannot be valid [Phaedo, 100(e)-101(a,b)].
He gives the example of the difference between “being two things” and “being a
pair of things”; the latter a formal, the former a physical fact. He also focuses on
the relation between parts and wholes in number theory, by comparing the gen-
eration of ‘two’ out of ‘two ones’ by bringing them together, and the separation
of ‘two’ into ‘two ones’ by dividing it [Phaedo, 97(a,e)]. The Zenonian influence
is plain, although scarcely discussed in the literature. But there is an even more
striking parallel. Plato’s philosophy is the first to introduce the idea that ev-
ery concept is itself some sort of extension, and thus can be divided.
This conceptual division moreover consitutes the core of the parallel between his
theory of being and his theory of knowledge, and became known through Aris-
totle as diairesis. It is, according to Plato, the technique shoring up properly
practiced dialectics, and is extensively applied in the Sophist, the Statesman,
and the Philebus. We will return in more detail to the Philebus, where the link
between conceptual and mathematical diairesis is established. As is well known.
Plato in the Sophist defines ‘dialectics’ as the art of making the proper distinc-
tions between the forms that instantiate themselves in and through particular
things [Sophist, 253d(1-3)]. In that dialogue, moreover, the difference established
between contraries and contradictions — between praedicative and existential
paradoxes — lays out the underlying ontological preconditions to which correct
application of dialectics must comply.31 Now consider a concept as an exten-
sion, with a domain of applicability that starts ‘here’ and ends ‘there’. How
then are ‘here’ and ‘there’ to be determined? By the dissection of a concept
into its constituting contraries says Plato, harking back to something already
paradoxes (see ft. 16), I demonstrated this unity rigourously.
30Tannery refers in this context to the critique of Protagoras on the geometers as quoted in
Aristotle [Met. B, ii, 997b(33)-998a(5)]: (...) for as sensible lines are not like those of which
the geometrician speaks (since there is nothing sensible which is straight or curved in that
sense; the circle touches the ruler not at a [single] point, as Protagoras used to say refuting the
geometricians). In a rare display of negligence, DK destroy exactly the point of the argument
by translating kanånoc by Tangente instead of ruler ! See [DK 80B 7], transl. in vol. II, p. 266;
P. Tannery, o.c., pp. 396-397.
31Platonists who doubt that they are spectators of Being must settle for the knowledge
that they are investigators of the verb ‘to be’. G.E.L. Owen, “Plato on Non-being”, Plato: a
Collection of Critical Essays, vol. i, G. Vlastos ed., Anchor/Doubleday, N.Y., 1971, p. 223.
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explained in the Parmenides, viz., the dichotomic way of reasoning. The method
by which diairesis should be applied is then demonstrated in the Philebus and
the Statesman by means of examples. In the latter dialogue, while trying to
define the good statesman, Socrates and his friends find out that the most long
and cumbersome, but nevertheless the best way [Statesman, 265(a)] to discover
the specific forms instantiated in a thing is by systematically dividing the con-
cept associated to it32 in opposing halves, like ‘living/non-living’ [id., 261(b)],
‘feathered/unfeathered’ [id., 266(e)] or ‘odd/even’, instead of arbitrarily sepa-
rating off a part — ‘Greeks’ vs. ‘barbarians’; ‘ten’ vs. ‘all other numbers’ [id.,
262(d-e)], say. This process ends when one bumps on undetermined parts or
elements or stoiqeØa [Sophist, 252(b3)], that are not themselves capable any-
more of specifying underlying parts [Statesman, 263(b)]. The word specification
makes sense here, because the element found can very well be a quantitative
plurality. The number of steps needed to reach from the undetermined unity
to this level of specification — the proportion between part and whole — then
defines somehow the original concept [Philebus, 16(d)].33 This, however, is of-
ten not possible, especially not when the praedicates are relative properties like
‘warm/cold’; ‘short/tall’ &c. Their opposites will run apart into infinity unless
a limit, a pèrac or boundary is put to them, in order to find the good measure
that guarantees their non-destructive aequilibrium and thus the reality of the
thing they describe [Statesman, 283(d,e)]. Given the constraints inhaerent to
our finite reasoning capacities, adequate criteria need to be developed to put
a peras to this infinity: he who begins with any individual unity should proceed
from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and (...) conversely, he who
has to begin with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about
for some number representing a certain quantity (...) [Philebus, 18(a-b)]. Now
in case the concept under consideration indicates an essence, natural ways of
division and limiting conditions are to a certain extend available. When it is
purely relative, like with e.g. the warm/cold-divide, it is much more difficult to
get hold of it and prevent division from running into infinity. In that case, a
limit will have to be imposed, not completely arbitrary, but nevertheless from
the outside. It is a matter of finding the correct mean [Philebus, 13(c,d)]. The
Stranger answers to the young Socrates’s question on the correct ways of di-
vision that there are two possibilities: In this way: the one through their [the
beings] shared relative greatness and smallness, the other through the necessary
essence of those that become.34 (...) we must suppose that the great and small
32The complex relation that exists within Plato’s system between a thing and the name
that it bears deserves a discussion of its own and will therefore remain out of our scope in
the present paper. Suffice it to remark that the relation is neither purely conventional, nor a
straightforwardly ontological attribution, leaving space for ‘false opinion’ on the epistemolog-
ical level, while the presence of sufficiently strong ontological ground for ‘true knowledge’ by
means of correct inference is established by means of the participation theory.
33I therefore only partically agree to Pelletier’s analysis of what it means to “carve nature
at its joints”. It has a very precise methodological import, which allows one to distinguish
between “predicates that do not denote forms”, apart from “dynamical” considerations. F.J.
Pelletier, o.c., pp. xvi-xvii.
34This part of the passage is my own translation. The translations devoted to it in the
standard literature excell by their incomprehensibility. The idea behind it is that if merely
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exist and are discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before,
only relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of
them with the mean [Statesman, 283(d-e)]. In order to acquire knowledge of a
something, one has to disscociate this one into a many via the great and small
by chopping it at every level into praedicative halves (more precisely: logical
complements) which represent the same property equipped with a positive or a
negative valuation indicating its being or being not so-and-so. The locus clas-
sicus for the method in the dialogues is a passage in the Phaedrus, where he
compares the division of a concept in opposing parts with the dissection of a
physical body: The second principle is that of division into species according to
the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver
might. Just as our two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of
unreason; and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and
may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right
and left of the same name — after this manner the speaker proceeded to
divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an
evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading
us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having
the same name (...) [Phaedrus, 265(e)]. This “process of division by genera”
[tÀn genÀn diaÐresic] is criticised by Aristotle [Anal. prior. I, xxxi] for being
impossible with regard to completeness, and for being question-begging: it is
not possible to effect a demonstration of substance [oÎsÐa] and essence [tä tÐ
âstin] this way, he says, because since many different divisions are possible, the
chosen one will be either arbitrary, either rest on foreknowledge precisely on
the points the division was intended to expose. This is the zest of the so-called
Socratic fallacy of which Geach and his followers accused Plato. But Plato ex-
plicitly says that he choses dichotomic division because it reduces arbitrariness,
and gives the strongest guarantee that all specific forms instantiated in the be-
ing investigated may be correctly identified [Statesman, 262(b); 265(a)]. The
process, moreover, can in principle always be carried through up to infinity, a
consequence of the One-Many nature of the relation between things and ideas:
(...) all the things which are ever said to exist are sprung from one and many
and have inherent in them the finite [peras] and the infinite [apeiron]. This being
the way in which things are arranged, we must always assume that there is in
every case one Idea of everything and must look for it — for we shall find
it [the Idea] is there — and if we get a grasp of this, we must look next for two,
if there be two, and if not, for three or some other number; and again we must
treat each of those units in the same way, until we can see that the original
unit is one and many and the infinite, but just how many it is. And we
relative, then greatness and smallness are divided by imposing a more or less arbitrary measure,
while when concerned with things that become, i.e., real entities, division has to follow their
intrinsical nature. The translation offered by De Win in his Dutch translation was helpful in
my rendering of this part of the passage, since it does capture precisely that idea. X. De Win,
Plato. Verzameld Werk, Boek III, De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, Antwerpen, 1980 (3th ed.),
p. 564. I used older edition, because the more recent edition has been mutilated zealots of
linguistic “modernisation”.
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must not apply the idea of infinite to plurality until we have a view of its
[plurality’s] total number between infinity and one; then, and not before,
we may let each unit of everything pass on unhindered into infinity. [Philebus,
16(a-d)]. The point by now should be clear. Of course infinity belongs itself to
the realm of the Ideas, while our imperfect reasonings are limited to the finite
realm. Therefore a peras or boundary has to be imposed, in order for them for
reach sensible conclusions instead of no conclusions at all. And we saw that,
in case the concept to be divided is not relative, but contains an essence — a
forerunner to Aristotle’s kategorein hos ousias — division will not be purely ar-
bitrary, and carry on until an intrinsic peras is reached. Indeed one can say that
the Form embodied by something here-and-now literally delineates it from the
rest of the world: it grants its identity, it acts as individuator. The problem the
Sophists have is that they fail to see this latter point: But the wise men of our
time are either too quick or too slow, in conceiving plurality in unity. Having
no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity
pass at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never occur to them. And
this, I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation
and true dialectic [Philebus, 16(a-d)]. Plato moreover is very precise on the lim-
iting criteria appropriate to this aim. In order for division to be not arbitrary,
but in accordance with the specificity of the subject of investigation, it should
be “through the middle” (di mèson), i.e., following the longest way [Statesman,
265(b)]. To divide the numbers by cutting of two thousand as opposed to all
the rest, or to divide humanity by cutting of the Greeks as opposed to all the
foreigners — the Lydians, the Phrygians could do the same —, is not only awk-
ward, but arrests at once the process of rational division. How then to divide
further? Dividing numbers into even and odd (not-even), and humans into male
and female (not-male) is valid for everyone, and leaves open a number of further
possibilities [Statesman, 262(c)-263(e)]. Again, setting aside simply a number of
a group encompassed by a basic essential idea only makes sense after diairesis
up to that basic idea has been completed. Division through the middle is the
best guarantee to find back the relevant subclasses at every step: It is safer to
proceed by cutting through the middle, and in that way one is more likely to find
classes [Statesman, 262(b)]. Now in order to find the smallest relevant part, the
essential idea — the species, eidos in the strict sense of the word — encoded in
the original concept, the division has to be executed up to the point where a
part is reached that is not itself anymore a class — not a gènoc [genos].35 These
two conditions are moreover connected: We must not take a single small part,
and set it of against many large ones, nor disregard species in making our divi-
sion [Statesman, 262(a-b)]. The relationship is not reciprocal: although a class
always is a part [meros], a part need not be a class at all: That when there is a
class of anything, it must necessarily be a part of the thing of which it is said
to be a class; but there is no necessity that a part be also a class [Statesman,
35With Plato this is not yet a precise technical term; we translate “class” following Balme:
gènoc used in general as a “kind” composed of related members, would be a natural choice for
a class-word; it is indeed ready to mean the genus which is divisible into related species. D.M.
Balme, “gènoc and eÚdoc in Aristotle’s Biology”, Classical Quartely, 12, 1, 1962, pp. 81-98.
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263(b)]. Indeed, once the level of the species reached, only quantitative divisions
remain possible, eventually up to infinity. This is why the Peripathetic School
will define a species by an elliptic formula as quae de pluribus differentibus nu-
mero in eo quod quid praedicatur.36 Real diairesis has finished: the difference
between the Greeks and the Lydians does not permit essential discrimination
because their difference does not cut through the whole of humanity anymore
— Greek women and Lydian women both remain women37 —; it is, whatever
its importance, contingent, or as Aristotle [Met. Z 4 1030a(10-13)] would say,
accidential. This fundamental idea, that division discriminates between species
up to the point where the smallest difference that is not merely numerical is
captured, lies at the origin of the Peripathetic differentia specifica: Species
infima (quae sola est species in sensu stricto) dicitur etiam species specialissima,
et differentia infima, differentia specifica.38
An Excursus on basic Number Theory.— In what follows some no-
tions from number theory will be used; the next paragraph only serves to give
the unfamiliar reader an intuitive grasp of the concepts involved. Consider a
set of objects sharing some common property. How can we characterise this set
without referring to its specific objects or properties? Clearly by some quan-
titative procedure: I can decide that one set is bigger than another one by
counting their respective elements. But then the question arises what ‘count-
ing’ really means: it means to pair univocally every element of a given set to
the elements of the set of natural numbers IN, in their standard order. This
is easy enough when the number of elements is limited. However, when we
look at it carefully, we see that two different characteristic numbers appear:
ordinal and cardinal numbers. Cardinals simply refer to the quantitative
range of a set seen as a totality, while ordinals take the order of appearance
of the elements into account. If I count a basket filled with apples, I can state
that there are ten of them after completing the process, or I can say that I
have the tenth apple in my hand, thereby stating that the ordinality of the
basket is ten as well, although there also is an eighth apple and a ninth. In
the case of finite numbers of elements, this all remains fairly straightforward.
The trouble begins when infinities are involved. Indeed, although it is impos-
sible to count an infinity, it is not impossible to conceive of one as a whole.
This is what we do when we speak of “the real line”, or any other geometrical
object. Let us look at a simple example. Suppose we count the set of even num-
bers {2, 4, 6, 8, . . .}, by associating to them the naturals in their standard order:
f(1) = 2, f(2) = 4, f(3) = 6, . . . Although we would not expect it, the countable
infinite cardinality (called Aleph-null, ℵ0) of the two sets is the same, for I will
always find a natural number to mark out whatever even number. So the part
is as big as the whole, so to speak. Their infinite ordinality ω is also the same,
36Porphyry, as cited in J. Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae,
Sumptibus Herder, Barcinone, 1961, p. 136.
37These examples are discussed in I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines.
Volume II: Plato on Knowledge and Reality, Routledge, London, 1963, pp. 371-372.
38J. Gredt, Elementa, p. 142.
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because I count them in the same order. Now count the set of even and odd
numbers, organised in sequence one after the other: {2, 4, 6, 8, . . . , 1, 3, 5, 7, . . .}.
Their cardinality is again ℵ0, but the latter’s ordinality is 2ω! Even worse, cardi-
nalities greater than ℵ0 do also exist. Let us look once more at a finite example.
The set {1, 2, 3} can be divided in all its parts or subsets by systematically la-
belling all elements for all possible subsets with a membershipsrelation ‘yes’ or
‘no’: {∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. We call the result the pow-
erset of the original set. How many elements are there in this set? The number
is always bigger than the number of elements n of the original set, and is given
by 2n; in this case 23 = 8. The cardinality of the powerset of IN is 2ℵ0 = ℵ1; it is
an uncountable infinity, bigger than ℵ0. So infinity comes in kinds. In fact, this
process can be continued, so that there are arbitrary many infinite cardinalities
out there... This shocking fact was discovered by G. Cantor towards the end
of the nineteenth century.39 And as we have seen: one of the ways to get there
is by a modern variant of dichotomic division. This will prove relevant for the
remainder of our story.
In the paragraph of Metaphysics A [987b25-27] where Aristotle explains how
knowledge and Forms hang together, he introduces seemingly out of the blue the
concept of number, and comments that Plato disagreed with the Pythagoreans
in making the in(de)finite apeiron not One but something he labels Indefinite
Twoness. Put otherwise, he says, the infinite is made up from the Large-and-
Small. Let us investigate in more depth the nature of the ‘twoness’ incorporated
in Platonic dichotomy. It is, as Aristotle explains in Book N of the Metaphysics,
closely related to Platonic number theory. The topic has caused considerable
contention in the literature, stirring a debate on plato’s so-called Unwritten
Doctrine. I do not need to get involved, however, for I subscribe fully and com-
pletely to Sayre’s point of view that the main tenets attributed to Plato in the
first book of the Metaphysics in fact are present in the Philebus.40 We will fol-
low Stenzel’s in depth analysis41, and add to it a further elaboration and some
39G. Cantor, “Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre”, in: Gesammelte Ab-
handlungen, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 1962. For a more reader-friendly treatment, see
R. Rucker, Infinity and the Mind. The Science and Philosophy of the Infinite, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1995 [1982].
40This fact is in itself quite undeniable and its recognition does not commit one to a posi-
tion on the “unwritten doctrine” central to the quarrel surrounding the “Tu¨binger Schule”-
interpretation (Kra¨mer, Gaiser) of Plato’s philosophy. It should be remarked, though, that
traces of Platonic diairesis can be found back in the earliest dialogues, and arguably con-
tributed to the development of Plato’s theory of Forms, at least according to M.K. Krizan, “A
Defense of Diairesis in Plato’s Gorgias, 463e5-466a3”, Philosophical Inquiry, XII(1-2), 1-21.
For the older scholarship on the question, see L. Robin, La the´orie platonicienne des ide´es
et des nombres d’apre`s Aristote. E´tude Historique et Critique, Georg Olms Verlag [reprint
1908], Hildesheim, 1963; and J. Stenzel (see further). Contra Robin, Stenzel, see H. Cherniss,
The Riddle of the Early Academy, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1945. For a recent
and moderate overview of the issues at stake, see D. Pesce, Il Platone di Tubinga, E due studi
sullo Stoicismo, Paideia, Brescia, 1990.
41I agree to a certain extend with M. Dixsaut, o.c., p. 221. sq. criticisms on Stenzel’s version
of Platonic diairesis in his Studien zur Entwicklung der Platonischen Dialectik von Sokrates
zu Aristoteles, Teubner Leibzig und Berlin, 1931. I do believe, however, that these objections
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illuminating examples provided by H. Oosthout in his commented translation of
Metaphysics N . We discussed before that, according to Plato, someone search-
ing for knowledge about a given thing has to lay bare its consituting elements by
determining by means of dichotomic division the number of pairwisely opposite
intermediate stages that separate (“are between”) that concept as a ‘one’ and as
an indeterminate [apeiron] ‘many’ of characteristics — metaxÌ toÜ peÐrou te kaÈ
toÜ ánìc [Philebus, 16(d)]42 —, The intellectual activities concommittant are the
work of the true philosopher vs. the work of the sophist [Sophist, 253(c)].43 It is
obvious that Aristotle’s later definition of dialectics finds its origin in this dis-
tinction. In the divisional scheme proposed by Stenzel-Oosthout44 the opposing
motions45 inhaerent in the Large-and-Small come about through aoristos duas
with a conceptual unity — 1 — at its centre: doubling in each step gives rise to
the powers of 2 over the totality of the process, while halving in each step gives
us the powers of 2−1. Two modes of generation are therefore at work simultane-
ously in the Platonic tree: doubling (2n) and halving (2−n) of the original One:,
. . . 1/8, 1/4, 1/2, 1, 2, 4, 8, . . ..46 The process stops, says Plato, when one reaches
the stage where one finds a part that is itself not further divisible, i.e., which
is itself not a genos of something else [Statesman, 263(a,b)]. In modern terms:
when one hits on those members or subsets — he calls them stoicheia, elements
— which contain themselves not subsets of the originally given set anymore,
i.e., by filtering out the singletons from the powerset. In order to be exhaustive,
this means that you have to take all the possible subsets of a given starting
set — genos — by a yes/no-divisional procedure, exactly in the way a present-
day mathematician would proceed when constructing the powerset. This also
explains why Plato insists on dichotomic division “through the middle” as the
method of “the longest way”: it is the only one that guarantees that you will
find back the truly ultimate members and not just some arbitrary intermediate
result [id., 265(a-b]. Aoristos duas can therefore be understood at each stage
as incorporating {0, 1}, the set of outcomes of the as yet undecided member-
shipsrelation. Evaluating all possibilities comes down to taking {0, 1}n, with n
the number of elements of the original set.47 The procedure is akin to what a
disappear when one takes Stenzel’s Zahl und Gestalt Bei Platon und Aristoteles, Teubner,
Leipzig, 1933 into account.
42The procedure is marked out by Plato’s method of separation of the different kinds of ‘to
be’ as outlined in the Sophist: recognition of the intermediaries as praedicative contraries at
once prevents one from falling into (existential) contradiction.
43J. Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt Bei Platon und Aristotles, Teubner, Leipzig, 1933 (2nd ed.),
pp. 12-13.
44H. Oosthout, Aristoteles. De Getallen en de dingen. De Boeken M en N van de Metafys-
ica. Deel 2: Boek N , Klement, Kampen, 2004, pp. 74-79.
45Te dynamics inhaerent in this time-dependent process has been analysed brilliantly by
G. Deleuze, while considering the paradoxical growth of Lewiss Caroll’s Alice in Wonderland.
See G. Deleuze, Logique du sens, Minuit, Paris, 1969, pp. 9-12.
46H. Oosthout, o.c., p. 79. Thus it can be linked to modern developments in the founda-
tions of mathematics. Hermann Weyl stresses exactly this aspect of Brouwer’s intuitionistic
approach, and links it explicitly to Plato: Brouwer erblickt genau wie Plato in der Zwei-
Einigkeit die Wurzel des mathematischen Denkens.H. Weyl, Philosophie der Mathematik und
Naturwissenschaft, Mu¨nchen, 1926, pp. 43-51.
47The relational logic that underpins Plato’s participation theory can be seen from this
14
botanist does when he or she consults a flora and decides systematically whether
a certain property is applicable to a given specimen or not, thus narrowing down
the number of remaining possibilities. I think it therefore appropriate to retain
a possibility which was considered but then dismissed by Sayre as a valid repre-
sentation of Plato’s procedure: to conceive unity and being as states in a binary
code (...), with succesive divisions of constituents ordered by level in an “inverse
tree” (...).48 This idea gets confirmation from an unexpected side. In his noto-
rious book Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft, Hermann Weyl
discusses L.E.J. Brouwer’s intuitionistic approach to number theory, and links
it explicitly to Plato: Brouwer erblickt genau wie Plato in der Zwei-Einigkeit
die Wurzel des mathematischen Denkens.49 Weyl refers to Plato’s ìristoc duac
[indeterminate twoness], the principle by which diairesis [conceptual division]
generates both the large and the small. Every branch of the divisional tree
represents a natural number which encodes for a possible combination of prop-
erties, and, as Oosthout rightly observes, it would be the fully Platonic option
to consider the branch with a number build up by only ones as the only one
properly determined. I therefore propose as a name for this Platonic quantifi-
cation of metaxu well-definedness φ-number (philosophical number). Consider
the example below. The number of well-determination in the example in the
scheme is at the bottom of the most right branch of the divisional tree, viz.,
1111 or decimal 15. It is an ordinal number (reached stepwise), and contains full
information concerning the divisional pathway followed to define the element,
for it orders the determining sequence by means of first differences, i.e. lexico-
graphical.50 The number of intermediate steps or generations needed to reach
the bottom level in our example is 3, whence another relevant number arises as a
consequence of the doubling-part of the diairetic procedure, equal to 23 = 8, the
number of elements found on the vertical line, or the cardinality of the subset
to which our φ-number belongs. This is what Stenzel intended when he writes:
Denkt man an die alte Darstellung der Zahlen durch punkte und faßt man, was
sehr nahe liegt, innerhalb der Zahlengestalt jeden punkt als stelle auf, so ergeben
sich mit einem Schlage Kardinal- und Ordinalzahlen, und es zeigt sich sofort
das einfache Bild einer entstehung der Zahlenreihe durch stete anwendung der
Zweiheit auf die eins und jede sich ergebende neue Einheit in ihrer ”Zweifach-
machenden” (diqotomc) Natur.51 As long as the number of steps needed to
reach the elements remains finite, the cardinality and ordinality of the sets of
products of the halving and of the doubling parts of diairesis will be the same.
This aequivalence between cardinality and ordinality is generally true in the
finite case. I accept with Stenzel-Oosthout that this is a modern formulation of
what Plato had in mind with his —limited, i.e., finite — Idea-Numbers. This
can be represented graphically (see figure). The asymmetry between 0 (aoristos
light. It also sheds more light on the precise nature of the difference between Plato’s and
Aristotle’s logical systems.
48K.M. Sayre, o.c., p; 55.
49H. Weyl, Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft, Mu¨nchen, 1926, pp. 43-51.
50K. Kuratowski and M. Mostowski, Set Theory, N. Holland, Amsterdam, 1968, pp. 224-227.
51J. Stenzel, o.c., pp. 30-32.
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duas) and 1 at every node of the diaretic tree is exemplified in the undetermi-
natedness of the 0-side at every bifurcation. And we saw that for Plato every
chain of reasoning accessible to the human intellect is by necessity finite. But...
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Figure 1: A formal representation of Plato’s divisional procedure
But something strange happens when this divisional process is carried through
up to infinity. Every single being at every moment instantiates many properties,
it “necessarily and always is becoming two” [Parmenides, 142(e)7-143(a)1], so
that the divisional process in principle never stops, although by imposing order it
somehow limits the Łpeiron pl¨joc [infinite multitude] [Parmenides, 143(a)2].52
Now at generation ω, the smallest order imposed by “counting” the set of nat-
ural numbers when the smallest φ-number written as an infinite sequence of
ones would be reached53, two different kinds of infinite cardinalities arise for the
halving and the doubling procedure, namely the countable and the uncountable
infinite. Stenzel-Oosthout do not seem to realise the cardinal difference between
these, for they seem to think that even in the infinite case the number of ele-
ments of the double-halve sequence remains the same at both sides of the 1–axis.
The same holds true for Sayre, who says: The result would be equivalent to an
expression of the natural numer series in binary notation.54 But this is wrong!
Aristotle not only gives clarification to what we already know from the dialogues
Sophist, Statesman and Philebus, but plainly states that Plato ultimately had
two infinities in mind: He [Plato] supposes two infinities, the Large and the
Small [Phys. 203a 15]. With each of these infinities goes a different mode of
realisation: everything is infinite, either through addition [i.e. stepwise], either
through division [i.e. simultaneously] (...) [Phys. 204a 6].55 These two represent
stepwise (halving; think of the standard views on Zeno’s paradox) vs. simul-
taneous (doubling) division, or in the traditional vocabulary, the potential and
the actual infinite. This articulates with another mistake: contrary to what our
authors believe, it is doubling which gives rise to the Small, and halving which
52See Sayre, o.c., pp. 54-57 for a discussion of the relevant passages of the Parmenides.
53Of course an impossibility for mortal men, for one cannot stepwise reach ω, although the
ordinality of the set of natural numbers exists as much as the natural numbers themselves...
54K.M. Sayre, o.c., p. 56.
55See the discussion in J. Stenzel, o.c., p. 30 sq.; p. 60 sq.
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gives rise to the Large once infinity is reached. This had been proven already by
Zeno. He showed that it is indeed the stepwise halving process that generates
infinitely many extended parts which are included — like atoms — in the whole
and therefore can still be further divided, while the simultaneous totality of the
doubling-procedure generates another infinity of unextended parts, members of
the whole without being included in it — like mathematical points.56 Both —
the megala kai mikra — are present in every finitely extended thing. The Pla-
tonic parallel with Zeno’s analysis will by now be clear: Plato’s Large-and-Small
tä mèga kaÈ tä mikrìn57 and Zeno’s large[s]-and-small[s] mègala kaÈ mikr [DK
29B 1] refer both to an infinite and through and through division, the first to
its operative principle, the latter to its paradoxical result.58 Plato’s metaphys-
ically marked preoccupation with concsistent — i.e., finite — pluralities forces
him to recover the paradoxical infinity resulting from Zeno’s deictic point of
view by means of an unlimited number of partial, finite perspectives that cover
the totality of the divisional tree. They are represented by the tree’s branches
and are uncountable infinite in number. These partial perspectives are what is
accesible to our human ‘mind’s eye’, while the simultaneous realisation of all
possibilities is confined to the world of Ideas, and is accesible only through the
Form ‘be’, present in and through anything that ‘is’ in whatever sense. Thanks
to an idea of M. Serfati, it will be possible to formally distinguish the set of
perspectives (l’ensemble des points de vue) from the tree itself.59 Everything is
embedded by an apeiron ple¯thos network of relations to everything else in the
world, so that, in order to truly know something you should be able to assign it
its place in the totality of the diairetic tree, which means that you would have
to overview it completely at once. But, according to Plato, the Form ‘be’ is not
in the same ontological realm as the beings themselves, therefore this absolute
knowledge is not within human reach. The best one can strive for is partial
knowledge against the background of an understanding of how true knowledge
in principle comes about, maybe after a walk outside the Cave. This sheds some
light on the interconnection of some problems treated separately in the existent
literature. At first the so-called “Socratic fallacy” imputed on Plato by Geach
which we mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Geach’s “Assumption A”,
that in order to correctly predicate a given term ‘T’, you must “know what it
is to be T” in the sense of being able to give a general criterion for ta thing’s
being T clearly is correct, for, metaphysically speaking, once you have to do it
generally, you have to do it universally. And his Assumption B, that it is no use
to try to arrive at the menaing of ‘T’ by giving examples trivially follows from
A, since it is impossible to pass in thought through infinitely many things —
as Aristotle takes care to remind us in [Anal. Post. I. 22, 83b7-8] — especially
56Cfr. W.E. Abraham, o.c., p. 48.
57Cited by Aristotle in e.g. [Met. A, 987b(20)]. Cfr. J. Stenzel, o.c., p. 6.
58Although I found it nowhere discussed in the literature. The singular in Plato’s expression
stems from the fact that he applies the paradoxical property to the abstract principle by which
division is obtained, while with Zeno the plural directly refers to its result.
59M. Serfati, “Quasi-ensembles d’ordre r et approximations de re´partitions ordonne´es”,
Math. Inf. Sci. hum., 143, 1998, pp. 5-26. The underlying structure is a so-called Post algebra,
of which Priest’s paraconsisten logics are a special case. See the next paragraph.
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when their number is uncountable. This by no means implies an error on Plato’s
side, given the careful discrimination of the ontological and eistemological levels
involved. Secondly, this also clarifies an issue raised by Aristotle in [Anal. Post.
II.13, 97a6-11], in a chapter that deals with diairesis and the discovery of def-
initions, about “some” who claim that, on order to know the differentia of A,
one has to know the differentia of B, C, D,... It is generally assumed that this
argument undermines the possibility of giving any definition.60 Tradition as-
cribes this view to Speusippus, Plato’s student and successor in the Academy.61
I am not sufficiently familiar with the extant sources concerning Speusippus,
but it seems clear to me that it is not recommendable to deny, as Falcon does,
that Speusippus builds his system an absolute or universal diairetic tree. On the
contrary, if he in any sense inherits the core structure of Plato’s metaphysics —
and it seems to be the case that he does — he needs it. Cherniss’s viewpoint
and mine are in agreement on this point, at least as I infer his from his descrip-
tion of speusippus endeavour: For Speusippus, however, the essential nature of
each thing is identical with the complex of all its relations to all other things, so
that the content of existence is nothing but the whole network of relations itself,
plotted out in a universal diaretical scheme. Consequently he could regard any
particular being as the analogue of the point, for the different entities are simply
different foci of the single system of relations. It is in the light of this theory of
essence that the separately existing numbers are to be understood.62
In the later tradition this will become the realm of the omnipresent God, who
has all infinitely many possibilities of Creation at once lais out before Him.63 For
the human mind, again, the relocation of the infinite to the realm of God’s Ideas
makes that the part of the tree accessible to it always remains partial. This finite
world is the world in which classical logic is valid. The paradoxical realm where
all possibilites are realised at once is safely relocated to the Ideal World. With
the pre-Socratics, however, the totality of the divisional process is paradoxically
given in the tangible here-and-now. But then again with Plato, being ideal does
not mean being unreal, quite the contrary! That is why the Platonic spectator
of Being in its One/Many-marked appearance retains a definitely paradoxical
flavour. The differences between the Zenonian divider into megala kai mikra
and the Platonic spectator of mega kai mikron are nevertheless relevant, and
can be clarified by comparing the divisional ontologies they represent.64 By
formalising them, these ontologies will become more transparant and more easily
comparable. This is the subject of our next paragraph.
60A. Falcon, Aristotle, Speusippus, and the Method of Division, Classical Quartely, 50, 2,
2000, pp. 402-414.
61L. Tara´n, A Critical Edition with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary,
Brill, Leiden, 1981.
62H. Cherniss, o.c., p. 42.
63I owe to a discussion with Michel Serfati that this basic scheme persists in Leibniz’s
philosophy. I am convinced that this is true as well for Newton, be it in a very different way.
64When it comes to application of our inferences to reality, A system of logic is a formaliza-
tion of an ontology! G. Gu¨nther, “Cybernetic Ontology and Transjunctional Operations”, BCL
publication 68. Photomechanically reproduced from Self-organizing Systems, 1962, Yovits, Ja-
cobi and Goldstein Eds., Washington D.C., Spartan Books, 1962, pp. 313-392.
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Plato’s not so classical classical logic
In this section we shall study Platonic diairesis from the point of view of formal
logic. The subject of Plato’s logic is not a popular one, although it deserves
attention. The relational logic implicit in the participation theory is, when dis-
cussed at all, often dismissed as being fallacious due to elementary logical errors
such as an improper ‘relation’-concept or self-praedication.65 However, it is to
be feared that the misconceptions involved are not Plato’s. According to H.-N.
Castan˜eda:
Contrary to the monolithic consensus among Plato scholars, in the Phaedo
Plato did distinguish, and soundly, between relations and qualities, and
dealt with genuine puzzles that arise in attempting to understand the na-
ture of relational facts. The reason why Plato’s theory of relations has
hitherto remained hidden to his commentators is this: his commentators
have either not understood the nature of relations, or, more recently, they
have adopted the dogma that a primary or simple relation is just one
atomic or indivisible entity that generates facts by being instantiated at
once by an ordered n-tuple. (...) It might be suggested at this juncture that
a nominalist must, nevertheless, distinguish between a thing a being longer
than another thing b, and the former being heavier than the second, and
this distinction must lie in facts themselves, in nature.66
Our perspective does not focus on the relational nature of Plato’s logic, but on
its inferential structure, c.q., on conceptual diairesis, although we will be able
to contribute something to the former aspect toward the end of this paper. The
general idea expressed in the quote remains valid for us as well, however: one
cannot properly appreciate the value of Plato’s logic if one does not take its
ontological foundation into account.
We discussed before why and how Platonic diairesis aimes at conceptually
fleshing out the different Forms or Ideas that instantiate themselves in a spe-
cific being: For it is from the mutual intertwinement of the Forms that reasoning
[logos]67 comes forth [Sophist, 259(e)]. Plato’s logic is the epistemological
face of his participation theory. Apart from what we discussed already, we
are not going to dwell on its details or its evolution throughout the dialogues,
or on the disagreements concerning these points among scholars.68 The main
aspects of the divisional procedure are outlined clearly enough by Plato himself
in what I call the diairetic dialogues, — Sophist, Statesman and Philebus, with
the Parmenides as a requirement — and suffice to expose its underlying logic.
We shall show that in Plato’s system every being, when not yet divided, is a
65See e.g. C. Strang, “Plato and the Third Man”, in: G. Vlastos, Plato: a Collection of
Critical Essays, Doubleday, 1971, pp. 184-200.
66H. N. Castan˜neda, “Plato’s theory of relations”, in Exact Philosophy, Mario Bunge ed.,
Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1973.
67We should never forget that ‘to reason’ and ‘to speak’ at that moment in history are still
understood as being the same thing! R.B. Onians, o.c., p. 13. Cfr. [Phaedrus, 266(b)].
68I nevertheless refer once again to Dixsaut’s and Sayre’s excellent work. An overview of
the topic and further references can be found in M.K. Krizan’s Defense-article.
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paradoxical One-and-Many — the Łpeiron pl¨joc discussed in [Parmenides,
143(a)2] — which becomes after complete diairesis a paraconsistent Large-
and-Small. Indeed, in [Philebus, 18(e)] Plato insists not only on the infinity
of individual things, but also on the infinity within every individual thing. It
really is a principle, (...) its nature is quite marvellous, for that one should be
many or many one, are wonderful propositions (...) [Philebus, 14(c)]. But when
we leave it at that, paradoxes involving infinity will pop up that cause problems
for our thought, especially when we use general concepts: Those (...) are the
common and acknowledged paradoxes about the one and many, which I may say
that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss (...) [Philebus, 14(d)]
An Excursus on Paraconsistency.— Let us, before we give an outline
of the formalism in which Plato’s logic can be cast, present an overview of some
basic notions, whereby comprehensibility will be given precedence over rigour.
In general, a logic is a system of propositions P,Q . . . and operators ∧,∨,¬, . . .
which allow to connect them into wellformed formulae according to some set
of rules specified in advance. A proof is a deductive scheme by which one for-
mula can be transformed into another, given certain hypotheses and by careful
application of the given set of rules (note that this presupposes some notion
of identity). There will be encoded in one way or another the notion of entail-
ment, which captures the general idea of ‘consequence’. This is linked to the
presence of a formally workable implication-relation. We can consider our for-
mal system from two different points of view: the syntactical viewpoint concerns
the correct construction of formulae from the basic formal elements, while the
semantical point of view investigates the validity of an inference by means of
the algebra of the truth values involved. We will take the latter point of view in
what follows. A classical logic (in the traditional sense) has as basic operators
‘AND’, ‘OR’ and ‘NEGATION’, and rests for the validity of its inferences on
three basic principles, the principle of contradiction: ∼P∧∼ P [PC], the prin-
ciple of identity: P = P [PI], and the Excluded Middle or Tertium non datur:
P∨ ∼ P [TND].69 They can already be found — in implicit or explicit form —
in Aristotle’s account in the metaphysics and in the books of the Organon.70
They guarantee that propositions be either true or false, and nothing else. Clas-
sical logics therefore are two-valued: the set of truth values for a proposition is
the pair {0, 1}. Such logics are also very appropriately called explosive, because
even the smallest violation of the PC causes a total collaps of the inferential
structure, captured in the ominous formula ex falso quod libet. Now paracon-
sistent logics are inferential systems that accept to a certain extend violations
69It is common practice to formally present classical logic without making any reference to
them, but it suffices to look at the truth table values for the material implication to realise
that they encode the ex falso, hence the PC. I realised this during a discussion with Koen
Lefever on a system he proposes to classify logical systems.
70Aristotle did never formulate explicitly the PI. He did formulate the TND. However, it is
the PC that is introduced as an axiom on ontological grounds, and translated in epistemologi-
cal terms: Metaphysics G, 1005a(19)-1005b(33). This is exactly why it is logically unprovable:
Met. G, 1005b(3)-1006(11). The TND is provable in propositional logic when one accepts the
PC; it is therefore clear that the original constitutive priority lies with the latter.
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of the PC, without automatically becoming explosive: (...) a minimal condition
for a suitable inference relation in this context is that it not be explosive. Such
inference relationships (and the logics that have them) have come to be called
paraconsistent.71 There can be many good reasons for developing less constric-
tive logical systems, where violation of the PC has more moderate consequences.
Such non-classical systems have been studied throughout the twentieth century,
following the seminal work of Jan  Lukaciewicz. He critisised the Principle of
Contradiction, and its corrolary, the Excluded Middle, for basically ontological
reasons, and introduced the notion of many-valued logics instead.72 Four valued
logical systems have been introduced by Da Costa and been further developed
mainly by Belnap73 and Priest. The approach developed by Priest is the most
relevant here: certain contradictions have to be allowed since under certain con-
ditions paradoxical situations do occur. The slogan would then be that (some)
paradoxes really exist. This view is sometimes called dialethism74 and it touches
of course upon Zeno’s paradoxes, which as we saw are at the heart of Plato’s
restrictive intervention with respect to the relations that are possible between
reality and what we can say about it.
Now to come back to our main topic: the point of view we will take with
respect to Platonic diairesis is the algebraic one. This is natural enough, since it
translates our semantical preoccupations and it allows us to see Plato’s diairetic
tree as an inverted propositional semi-lattice. A proposition will be a (finite or
infinite) branch of the tree starting from a bottom element, the given concept.
Logically, each branch is the conjunction, lattice-theoretically the meet
∧
pi of
determined and indetermined praedicates along its descending nodes. Here we
view a concept extensionally as a set of elements — ‘beings’ — on which a
given praedicate — ‘Form’ — is applicable. The division of a concept will be
represented formally as the division of a given concept set into a smaller property
set and its exclusive complement, in an exhaustive way. The partial order 6 over
the semi-lattice expresses in a natural way the idea of logical strength as the
diairetic ‘sharing this property’-relationship.75 This obviously coincides with
set-theoretic inclusion. Platonic division, when completed, thus comes down
formally to taking the powerset of the original conceptset. This, however, does
not yet exhaust the structure that is present in the diairetic tree. The intensional
nature of Plato’s logic emerges clearly in the path-dependance of the truth values
at every node.76 Indeed an additional order≺ has to be imposed to catch the fact
71G. Priest, “Paraconsistent Logic”, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd ed., Kluwer,
Dordrecht etc., 2002, p. 288.
72J.  Lukasiewicz, U¨ber den Satz des Widerspruchs bei Aristoteles, trans. J.M. Bochenski,
Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 1993.
73N. Belnap, “A useful four-valued logic”, in: Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic, J.M.
Dunn and G. Epstein (eds.), D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Boston, 1977, pp. 8-37.
74G. Priest, In Contradiction. A study of the transconsistent, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
75S. Vickers, Topology via Logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989/1996, p. 13.
76Intensionality on behalf of Plato has been argued for by J.M. Moravcsik, “The Anatomy
of Plato’s Divisions”, in: E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos and R.M. Rorty (eds.), Exegesis and
Argument. Phronesis Supplementary Volume I, N.Y., Humanities Press, 1973, pp. 324-348.
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that the path towards a specific stage in the division — i.e., a unique φ-number
— is retained: at every level the φ-numbers will again be ordered, according to
first differences. Such an order is called lexicographical. This allows to clarify
Serfati’s suggestion that one can regard a higher order division as “meilleur”77,
and formally captures the classic idea that species can be distinguished by their
differentia specifica: the smallest difference which does not merely discriminate
numerically between individuals of the same kind. Thus the overall order is not
partial, but total: every branch will be uniquely determined by the totality of
the procedure leading to it. Mathematically speaking, this procedure gives rise
to a semi-lattice with a total order ≺. This is illustrated in the diagram below:
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Figure 2: The diairetic semi-lattice of finitary arguments
A proof of a proposition consists of the whole diairetic tree up to the required
generation. A concept will be completely determined through diairesis up to
generation pn with ν(p) = 1,∀n. We can therefore speak of the determination
value of every sub-branch taken as a whole. When only ‘1’s occur, this total
value will be the φ-number < 1n >. Occurrence of a ‘0’ in a sequence < pn >
means that there is still aoristos duas contained in the concept under consid-
eration, c.q., that determination up to that level is not logically complete even
though the appropriate singletons are reached, so that its value remains inde-
termined, a fact symbolised by zeros in the sequence: < 0/1n>. This is a way
to diagnose that division has followed a wrong path. When division has been
carried out correctly, i.e., through the middle, the level of the ÊdÐa oÎsÐa, the
esential ideas [Phaedo, 101(c)3)] instantiated in the being under investigation
can be reached. If this is not possible, an appropriate measure or limit (peras)
has to be imposed (we saw that perfect knowledge of all ideal relationships
of a being would require knowledge of the uncountable Total Tree of Being, of
which all finite trees are a part). The truth values in Plato’s system will therefore
be (partially/completely) determined and (partially/completely) inde-
77M. Serfati, o.c., p. 6
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termined rather than simply true and false.78 Plato’s peras criterion can thus
be translated as the requirement that division, in order to be complete, should
be carried out up to the level of the singletons in the powerset: they are “parts
but not classes” in Plato’s terms, species but not genera, which, although them-
selves sets, cannot be written as the union of smaller subsets anymore, hence
cannot be further divided. The choice of the concept to start with will influ-
ence the length of the tree, a point that elicits Aristotle’s negative comment.
Filtering the singletons out will give the fundamental elements or stoicheia. The
fact that this element-species still is a numerical plurality — the species ‘man’
obviously comprises many individuals — does not change anything to the mat-
ter, as we discussed before. But what is the Platonic determination value of a
proposition obtained after complete ’up to singletons) division? Clearly we need
to include the diairetic tree associated to a specific division in its entirety in our
formalism. Once division is completed, Plato obviously does not care anymore
about the intermediate inferential steps. It is therefore natural to associate the
determination value ‘1’ to the branch with the φ-number <1n>, and the value
‘0’ to all the others. The totality of the divisional process is represented by the
completed tree which contains both determined and indetermined elements, and
therefore has itself the value ‘both’. Finally, evidently nothing has been deter-
mined when no division is accomplished at all (‘none’). Now we put completely
determined = top element = {0, 1}; completely indetermined = bottom element
= ∅. The number of Platonic determination values can thus again be limited to
four: nothing, determined, undetermined, everything. Set-theoretically
we have {∅, {0}, {1}, {0, 1}}. The set of overall Platonic truth values is the
powerset of the set of truth values for classical logic (the pair {0, 1})! it can be
represented by a powerset lattice:
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Figure 3: Plato’s four valued truth-lattice
78I choose this terminology in reference to W.E. Johnson’s discussion of “the principles
of logical division” in his classic on logic, although my use of ‘determined’ vs. ‘in[completely]
determined’ is different from his.W.E. Johnson, Logic, Part I, Chapter IX: “the determinable”,
Cambridge, 1921.
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The determination value of single propositions or branches is a mapping into the
four valued set of possible determinations {none, true, false, both}. Every step
in the argument adds a 0 (‘false’) or a 1 (‘true’) to the determination chain. The
determination ‘both’ means that, at the end of a reasoning process, one notes
that one has a chain of either zeros, either ones, or both. The determination
‘none’ means that no divisional resolution of the original apeiron ple¯thos has yet
been executed: you see everything at once, but cannot discriminate anything at
all. (In argumentative terms, to go from ‘none’ directly to ‘both’ would imply
a forbidden un-limited One/Many-paradoxical jump.) In Platonic terms this
comes down to a complete lack of knowledge exept with respect to the existence
of the thing under consideration. We can make up the tables for the determina-
tion values of complex propostions and generalise them to all propositions in a
given tree (finite or infinite):
¬
t f
f t
b b
n n
∧ t f b n
t t f b t
f f f f f
b b f b b
n t f b n
∨ t f b n
t t t t t
f t f b f
b t b b b
n t f b n
Figure 4: Truth tables for Platonic diairesis
This is important, because the total number of possible 0/1-combinations in the
Total Tree is infinite. To be precise, the total number is {0, 1}IN. Recall that
this does not require the number of inferential steps in a specific argument to
be infinite, on the contrary! Although the number of properties and therefore
the number of possible diairetic perspectives on every specific being is infinite, a
correct argument is kept finite precisely by succesfully digging up the appropri-
ate peras or limiting condition, viz. the set of essential properties, to the thing
investigated.
Plato’s methodological scheme thus has the structure of a four-valued para-
consistent logic, although with the remarkable feature that it remains Boolean,
because the complements are exclusive. An interesting point is furthermore that
this logic can be reduced to first order praedicate logic, as is the case for the rela-
tional system exposed by Castan˜eda, so that our reconstruction of Plato’s logical
system remains at least in principle commensurable to his results.79 Plato’s logic
is not entirely classical, since it violates in a precise way his own dogma that
sums up the demand for logical consistency, the Principle of Contradiction, by
allowing somthing to be “true” and “not true” up to a certain extend, though
without rendering the whole thing explosive. This lends some additional support
to Sayre’s point of view, that Plato shifts in the later dialogues to an ontology
which is less restictive with respect to the self-identity of the Ideas. This relax-
79H. N. Castan˜neda, “Plato’s theory of relations”, in Exact Philosophy, Mario Bunge ed.,
Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1973.
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ation never occurs on the level of single propostions; it implies consideration
of the whole of which a being is part, or, epistemologically speaking, of the
relational context of the proposition. Only on the level of the Total Tree this
process would come to an end, since every being after finite division still con-
tains some undetermined twoness, and therefore remains uncompletely resolved.
On the level of the supreme idea of Being the undetermined twoness ultimately
disappears. On the level of Being it would cause not innocent contraries, but
fatal contradictions.80 Plato avoids this by his limiting or peras-condition which
renders all particular arguments finite (we project them against a simplifying
screen, so to say), while the actual infinity of possibilities in which they lie
embedded captures the inconsistency required by the fact that real things are
undetermined and therefore on a deeper level instable without a priori destroy-
ing the fabric of knowledge.
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Figure 5: The Philebian fractal
Plato’s divisional logic can easely be generalised to an infinity of truth values,
by taking the diairetic tree itself as the basis of a truth value semi-lattice with
bottom element ∅ and “top element” {0, 1}IN.81 Every sequence encodes a nu-
merical truth value between 0 and 1; the generalisation thus naturally leads
us into the realm of fuzzy logic. One then construes the zeros in every de-
terminative sequence as an explicit quantification of conceptual uncertainty or
indeterminedness, or as a statistical distribution of the possible choices in a
game. The geometry that goes with it is that of a “Theorem Fractal” as pro-
80Prepared in the Sophist, where the different modi of the verb ‘to be’ — existential and
praedicative — are discussed in detail and related to their ontological import. Aristotle follows
the lead in [Met. ∆, vii], where he discerns the kinds of ‘be’ not according to their function,
but according to the kind of oppositions to which they give rise. For a discussion K. von Fritz,
“Der Ursprung der Aristotelischen Kategoriernlehre”, in: Schriften zur griechischen Logik,
Fromann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, band 2, 1978, pp. 14-15.
81M. Barnsley, Fractals Everywhere, Academic Press, Boston Etc., 1988.
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posed by Grim.82 When referring specificially to Plato’s construction, I will call
it the Philebian fractal. A modal interpretation of the Philebian fractal, and
thus of the Total diairetic Tree, could be that, taking the ideal world of full
determination as the actual one, the growing number of zeros in a formula at
a given generation would indicate the decrease in “accessibility” of the possible
world encoded by it when compared to the one of the determined concept. This
remains in line with our earlier discussion about deixis, because in Zenonian this
world complete determination also coincides with total actualisation, but cen-
tered in the Here-Now. Modality for Zeno would be spatiotemporal disclocation
from the pointing world-centre at the Here-Now. But in Plato’s world, only for
God everything is simultaneously present, as if only His eye can bear the sight
of everything at once in all aspects of its being and non-being without being ab-
horred or disturbed by this unfathomable multiplicity. The differences between
the Zenonian divider into megala kai mikra and the Platonic spectator of mega
kai mikron are important, because transition form the One to the Many in the
latter case can only take place in a mediated way. They remain connected nev-
ertheless. That is why the Platonic spectator of Being in its One/Many-marked
appearance definitely retains a paradoxical flavour.
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Figure 6: From Zeno’s “logic” to Plato’s logic
It are precisely these two infinities that will trouble Aristotle so deeply. For him
it does not make sense to speak of a reality more real than reality as it is given.
If another ontological level is needed, then it should be one that is less real,
hence his relocation of “actual” infinity to the realm of imagination. It is not
completely unreal, however, but has the status of a kind of limiting case, akin
to the final cause of any concrete being. Aristotle realises that he needs actual
infinity if he wants to have the continuum; that is why he does not simply can
do away with it. Epistemologically, Plato’s peras becomes Aristotle’s horos in a
syllogistic argument, classically known as the terminus or “extreme”, of which
there are two, the Major and the Minor, not incidentially the latin translations
for “Great” and “Small”. But that is a subject for another paper.
82As was pointed out to me by J-P. Van Bendegem. See P. St. Denis and P. Grim, “fractal
Images of Formal Systems”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25, pp. 181-122, 1997.
26
Acknowledgements
I wholeheartedly want to thank Frans de Haas (Leiden University) for many
hours of fruitful discussions, and a wealth of useful suggestions and interesting
ideas. During my stay at Leiden I had less time than I had wished to discuss
the themes of my paper with Vasilis Politis (Trinity College, Dublin), who was
visiting there in the same period. His influence on some of my work is neverthe-
less undeniable. I am also inspired by some discussions at the Leiden seminar on
the Analytica posteriora 2007-2008 organised by Frans, and of which Vasilis and
Pieter-Sjoerd Hasper (Groningen University) were part. Jean-Paul Van Ben-
degem (Brussels Free University) made some useful technical suggestions, and
Tim Van der Linden (idem) the figures. Finally, I am much obliged to Claudio
Beccari of the University of Turin, who not only gave me invaluable advise with
respect to editing Greek texts in LATEX, but also took the pains to comment on
the content of my paper.
A note on bibliography and used translations
For Plato’s text I relied on the Oxford edition by Burnett. The Aristotlian texts
are from the Loeb edition. The pre-Socratic fragments all stem from the Diels-
Kranz edition. The translations of Plato are based on the sources mentioned in
the following list, but none of these are strictly followed and are adapted when
deemed necessary:
Platonis Opera, I. Burnet (ed.), Oxford Classical Texts, Clarendon, Oxford,1900–
1907 [1952].
Plato, Collected Works in Twelve Volumes, H.N. Fowler (ed.), Loeb Classical
Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1914 [1999].
The Dialogues of Plato, translated into English with Analyses and Introductions
by B. Jowett, in Five Volumes. Oxford University Press, 1892.
Plato, Verzameld Werk, X. De Win (vert.), De Nederlandsche Boekhandel/Ambo,
Antwerpen, 1980.
Aristotle, Complete Works in Twenty three Volumes, Loeb Classical Library,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1930 [2002].
H. Diels and W. Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, erster Band, Weidmann,
Dublin, Zu¨rich, 1951 [1996].
For further bibliographical information the reader is referred to the footnotes.
27
